Grubb's dubious statements maligning the Bank of North America

Grubb goes to great lengths to portray the Bank of North America, the nation’s first joint stock commercial bank, as a weak and ineffectual institution incapable of competing in the market place with Pennsylvania’s state-issued bills of credit. As our published paper makes clear, we do not accept that characterization. Below, we go further in defense of the bank by spelling out what we believe are specific mistakes in Grubb’s argument.

 

1.          Grubb (2003, p. 1787) writes “Market participants seemed to prefer state currency to Morris’s banknotes. (Schweitzer, 1989, p. 321; Grubb, 2002c). Hamilton remarked ‘Your Notes though in Credit with the Merchants by way of remittance do not enter far into ordinary circulation . . .’ (Bouton, 1996, p. 107) Morris remarked that his banknotes were ‘constantly returned upon me for payment [in specie] instead of being absorbed by the taxes’ (Ver Steeg, 1976, p. 119).”


In the early 1780s, Morris circulated private IOUs, known as “Morris notes,” drawn on his own credit which were altogether distinct from the bank’s notes. Both Morris’s and Hamilton’s comments concern Morris’s private notes, not those of the bank. Hamilton wrote Morris (Ferguson et al, 1973-2000, vol. 6, p. 540) that “the bank notes pass pretty currently as Cash with a manifest preference to your Notes.”

 

2.          Grubb (2003, p. 1787) writes “In 1789 [the Bank of North America] issued notes in denominations of 1/90th of a dollar. This odd denomination makes sense when it is noted that 1/90th of a dollar equals one pence in Pennsylvania pounds – a further indication that the bank was struggling to get its banknotes to displace Pennsylvania pounds in the marketplace.”


That the bank emitted small denomination notes denominated in Pennsylvania pence indicates nothing more than that dividing the dollar into ninetieths, not hundredths, was still the prevailing practice in the 1780s. Decimalized currency was a newfangled contrivance that had not yet been commonly adopted. The bank’s bylaws, enacted in 1782 when the bank was founded, stipulated “that the Books and Writings of the Bank shall be kept in Mexican dollars and Ninetieth Parts thereof” (Ferguson et al, 1973-2000, vol. 7, p. 811). Thus the practice Grubb mentions was part of the Bank’s original plan, not a measure adopted in desperate response to competitive pressure.

 

3.          “Foreigners,” Grubb (2003, p. 1787) asserts, “refused to invest in the bank’s stock.”


Opponents of the bank accused it of attracting foreign investment. “Foreigners will doubtless be more and more induced to become stockholders,” the bank’s foes charged, “until the time may arrive when this enormous engine of power may become subject to foreign influence.” When the second subscription of bank stock was completed in 1786, Pennsylvanians had purchased 59.1 percent, other Americans had purchased 27.8 percent, and Europeans had acquired 13.1 percent (Pennsylvania Gazette, 30 March 1785; George David Rappaport, 1996, pp. 182-4).

 

4.          “Only Connecticut, however, accepted BNA banknotes for payment of its taxes” (Grubb, 2003, p. 1787).


Lawrence Lewis (1882, p. 43) mentioned that Connecticut passed a law making banknotes acceptable in payment of taxes, but Grubb incorrectly concludes that only Connecticut did so. Other states passed similar laws (Ferguson et al, 1973-2000, vol. 2, pp. 181-2, n. 6). Also, it is presumptuous to assume that without such a law tax collectors would, by default, refuse to accept banknotes. In eighteenth century America, it was difficult to induce people to pay taxes at all. A tax collector or state treasurer would have to be extraordinarily obstinate to refuse banknotes. At worst they would have to exchange the notes for specie before coming to account.

 

5.          Grubb (2003, p. 1788) quotes both the president and the founder of the bank apparently confessing their incompetence. “In 1784, Thomas Willing, the president of the BNA, wrote to would-be bankers in Massachusetts, ‘the business was as much a novelty to us . . . as it can possibly be to you. It was a pathless wilderness, ground, but little known to this side the Atlantick . . . All was to us a mystery’ (Norman Scott Brien Gras, 1937, pp. 209-10) To the Pennsylvania legislature, Morris admitted that the ‘circulation and amount of bank paper is but little understood’ (Hans Louis Eicholz, 1992, p. 266).”


Willing’s letter was not a confession of incompetence, but rather an account of how the bank overcame early difficulties. The bank’s business was so well-managed, Willing boasted, “as would not disgrace the Books of some of the older establishments of this kind in Europe, & I flatter myself th[a]t in time, it will rival the first of them” (Gras, 1937, p. 211). As for the statement attributed to Morris, he never said it. William Findley, the bank’s most prominent foe, was the one who did. Footnote

 

6.          Grubb (2004a) writes that “Coincident with this new issue of Pennsylvania pounds, the six-month dividend declared on the BNA’s stock collapsed from 9.5 percent in mid-1784 to 3 percent by mid-1785, where it stayed until 1791. . . Not until Pennsylvania pounds had disappeared from circulation did it recover to a steady return of 6 percent. Morris clearly associated competition from Pennsylvania’s state currency with the initial dividend collapse in the bank’s stock value, and associated the removal of this competition with the subsequent revival of the value of BNA’s stock . . . Other possible events cannot explain the timing of these changes in the BNA’s stock value” (Grubb 2004a, b, pp. 9-10, 14).


As Grubb correctly notes, the bank resumed paying hefty dividends in 1791. Grubb’s chronology, developed in detail in Grubb (2004a), maintains that Pennsylvania pounds were the dominant medium of exchange until displaced some time after 1794. It is therefore inconsistent for him to argue that the dividend did not recover “until Pennsylvania pounds had disappeared from circulation.”


Nor is this the only difficulty. That Morris associated the dividend fluctuations to competition with state-issued bills is an unsubstantiated assertion. The passage from an unpublished dissertation cited in support of the contention is itself based on a passage from a letter Morris wrote Jefferson on 11 June 1781, before the bank had even been established, in which Morris encouraged Jefferson and Jefferson’s friends to subscribe, promising them that the bank’s stock would offer a large and certain income (Ferguson et al, 1973-2000, vol. 1, p. 142).